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 Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence: 
The Possibilities of Unfinished Alternatives 
 
Allegra M. McLeod∗ 
 
[M]ost prisoners walk into prison because they know they will be dragged or beaten into prison if they 
do not walk.  They do not organize force against being dragged because they know that if they wage this 
kind of battle they will lose—very possibly lose their lives.  The experience of the prisoner is, from the 
outset, an experience of being violently dominated, and it is colored from the beginning by the fear of 
being violently treated.1 
I have gradually acquired the belief that the alternative lies in the unfinished, in the sketch, in what is 
not yet fully existing.  The “finished alternative” is “finished” in the double sense of the word.2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Confronting criminal law’s violence calls for an openness to unfinished 
alternatives—a willingness to engage in partial, in process, incomplete reformist 
efforts that seek to displace conventional criminal law administration as a primary 
mechanism for social order maintenance. 3   The entrenched harms entailed by 
invoking criminal law as a widespread social regulatory framework include at least 
these: Approximately two million persons in the United States live on any given day 
caged behind bars, the largest population in the world under criminal supervision.4  
                                                
∗Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. For generative discussion, 
insight, and inspiration, I owe thanks to Paul Butler, Sara Sun Beale, David Cole, Angela 
Harris, Issa Kohler-Hausmann, David Luban, Derin McLeod, Naomi Mezey, Alyson Nelson, 
Eloise Pasachoff, Nina Pillard, Alicia Plerhoples, Judith Resnik, Alvaro Santos, Louis Michael 
Seidman, Joshua Teitelbaum, Philomila Tsoukala, Robin West, the editors of Unbound, and 
especially Yxta Murray. 
1 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1607 (1986). 
2 THOMAS MATHIESEN, THE POLITICS OF ABOLITION: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL ACTION 
THEORY 13 (1974). 
3 See also Cover, supra note 1, at 1601 (“Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the 
imposition of violence upon others: A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a 
result, somebody loses his freedom, his property, his children, even his life.”). 
4 See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Mass Incarceration: Causes, Consequences, and Exit Strategies, 9 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 1 (2011); see also LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at 1 (2011); Adam Gopnik, The 
Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at 72 
(“The scale and brutality of our prisons are the moral scandal of American life.”). The United 
States is an outlier relative to other countries in both its incarceration rates and public safety 
outcomes, particularly with regard to gun violence and recidivism. See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, 
THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN CONTEMPORARY 
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Conditions of confinement in U.S. prisons and jails are often brutal, as the following 
images from the record accompanying the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion in 
Brown v. Plata reflect:  
 
 
Mentally ill inmates in holding cages in California prison system.5 
 
 
California Institution for Men, August 7, 2006.6 
                                                                                                                           
DEMOCRACIES (2008); Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y.TIMES, 
(Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html; see also Kieran 
Healy, America is a Violent Country, (Jul. 12, 2012), 
http://www.kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2012/07/20/america-is-a-violent-country/ 
(demonstrating that the United States is more violent than other OECD countries (except 
possibly Estonia and Mexico)); PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM (2011). 
5 See Dave Gilson, Slideshow: California’s Jam-Packed Prisons, MOTHER JONES, (May 23, 
2011), http://www.motherjones.com/slideshows/2011/05/california-prison-
overcrowding-photos/holding-cages (describing and displaying images from the record in 
Brown v. Plata not incorporated in the Court’s opinion). 
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Millions more are routinely subject to humiliating, racially and class-skewed 
policing practices, to the looming threat of immediate incarceration, and to the stigma 
of arrest, criminal conviction, probation, and parole.7  These intrusions visit long-
lasting physical, psychic and social-structural injuries upon those subject to them.8  
What is more, these practices collectively ingrain an over-simplification of complex 
social problems—mental illness, addiction, homelessness, and violence—reducing 
these problems to binary conceptualizations involving criminal wrongdoers and 
innocent aggrieved victims, and in turn foreclosing more careful, institutionally or 
context-sensitive regulatory interventions. 9   All of this carries exorbitant costs: 
spending on prisons outpaces investments in education, early childhood programs, 
and public health; and family ties are routinely ruptured by criminal law’s 
                                                                                                                           
6 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1950 app. A. (2011). 
7 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN 
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999). There are various prevalent forms of sub-
felony penal control beyond conventional criminal case processing, including in the 
misdemeanor and community supervision contexts. See Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial 
Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013); Michelle Phelps, The 
Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 35 LAW & POL’Y 51 
(2013). 
8 See, e.g., BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); see also 
Paul Butler, Stop and Frisk: Sex, Torture, Control, in LAW AS PUNISHMENT/LAW AS REGULATION 
155 (Austin Sarat et al. eds.) (2011) (“[S]tops and frisks cause injuries similar to those of illegal 
forms of tortures  …”); Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the NYPD's Stop-and-Frisk Policy in 
the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813 (2007). 
9 See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); see also 
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2002) (exploring how crime and punishment policies are linked to 
fundamental problems of governing contemporary societies); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE 
ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2010) 
(examining how faith in “free markets” has severely distorted U.S. punishment practices); 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Lessons From the Deinstitutionalization of Mental 
Hospitals in the 1960s (John M. Olin Law & Economis Working paper No. 542) available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/542-335-bh-incarceration_0.pdf. (tracing the 
relationship between deinstitutionalization and the rise of mass incarceration and arguing that 
the deinstitutionalization of mental hospitals in the 1960s offers important lessons to those who 
seek to reduce the incarcerated population in the United States in the twenty-first century); 
Bernard E. Harcourt, An Institutionalization Effect: The Impact of Mental Hospitalization and 
Imprisonment on Homicide in the United States, 1934–2001, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 41 (2011) 
(“[P]atterns of mental hospitalization versus incarceration are practically inverted over the 
20th and 21st centuries.”).  
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intervention in ways that contribute to inter-generational cycles of poverty, 
underemployment, and disadvantage.10  
Simultaneously, the over-reliance on criminal law to manage an array of social 
concerns frequently fails to fulfill other socially valuable ends for which criminal law is 
supposedly intended: honoring the interests of victims, and preventing assault, theft 
and related misconduct. 11  In fact, criminal proceedings routinely re-traumatize 
victims of serious crime through a prosecutorial process that fails to provide promised 
closure or emotional repair to aggrieved persons.12  Moreover, both common sense 
and substantial empirical evidence suggest that the vast size of the population under 
criminal control, the excessive length of sentences, the absence of rehabilitative 
opportunities for the convicted, and the degree of over-criminalization are such that 
deterrence goals are not advanced and may even be undermined.13  
Despite all of these indications that the status quo in U.S. criminal law 
administration is profoundly dysfunctional—an institutional manifestation of the 
deepest pathologies in our society—contemporary criminal law reform efforts and 
scholarship focus almost exclusively on relatively limited modifications to the status 
                                                
10 See, e.g., John Schmitt et al., CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY, THE HIGH 
BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION (2010). 
11 See, e.g., Gerald T. Hotaling & Eve S. Buzawa, Forgoing Criminal Justice Assistance: The Non-
Reporting of New Incidents of Abuse in a Court Sample of Domestic Violence Victims, (January, 2003) 
(unpublished manuscript) available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195667.pdf. (finding victims of domestic 
violence who initially turn to the criminal justice system for intervention may be so dissatisfied 
with the outcome that they do not call the police the next time they need help); Yxta Maya 
Murray, Rape Trauma, the State, and the Art of Tracey Emin, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1631, 1659 (2012) 
(“Thousands of women submit rape kits to the police and wait, only to have them stowed or 
thrown away.”); Editorial, Evidence of Rape Ignored, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2013 (citing as many as 
400,000 untested stowed away rape kits in the United States). 
12 See, e.g., Patrice Yancey Martin & R. Marlene Powell, Accounting for the “Second Assault”: 
Legal Organizations’ Framing of Rape Victims, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 853, 856 (1994) 
(“[W]omen whose cases were prosecuted were less well off psychologically six months after the 
rape than were those whose cases were not prosecuted, attributing this result to the effects of 
an adversarial legal system that subjects rape victims to challenge and duress.”). 
13  See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility & Discounting of 
Imprisonment & the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1999) (considering diminishing 
returns in terms of deterrence of increasing sentence lengths); Paul H. Robinson & John M. 
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its 
Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2002) (“[E]ven if a deterrence distribution has a net immediate crime-
control benefit over a justice distribution, over time that benefit may be outweighed by the 
slowly building criminogenic effect that results when citizens come to hold their criminal 
justice system in contempt.”); see also Yair Listokin, Efficient Time Bars: A New Rationale for the 
Existence of Statues of Limitations in Criminal Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002) (demonstrating in 
the context of statutes of limitations that delayed sentencing for a crime for more than five 
years after its commission is likely inefficient from a deterrence perspective). 
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quo.14   These modifications may well render criminal law administration more 
humane, but fail to substitute alternative institutions or approaches to realize social 
order maintenance goals.15  In particular, these reformist efforts continue to rely on 
conventional criminal regulatory approaches to a wide array of social concerns, with 
all of their associated violence: on criminalization, policing, arrest, prosecution, 
incarceration, probation, and parole.  Thus, even as these reformist approaches may 
offer substantial benefits, they remain wed to institutions that perpetrate criminal 
law’s violence and to limited temporal and imaginative horizons.  
By contrast, this essay explores a series of criminal law reform alternatives that 
offer more fundamental substitutes for criminal law administration.  More specifically, 
this essay focuses on the possibilities of alternatives to criminal case processing that 
substitute for the order-maintaining functions currently attempted through criminal 
law enforcement.  These alternatives hold the potential to draw into service separate 
institutions and mechanisms from those typically associated with criminal law 
administration.  Further, these alternatives enlist on more equal footing and invite 
feedback and input from persons subject to criminal law enforcement.  
Importantly, this latter subset of reform alternatives is decidedly unfinished, partial, 
in process.  I will argue that this unfinished quality ought not to be denied as an 
embarrassment or flaw, but instead should be embraced as a source of critical 
strength and possibility.  In this dimension, this essay is a preliminary call for more 
attention on the part of legal scholars and criminal law reform advocates to unfinished 
partial substitutes for the order-maintaining work performed by criminal law 
administration—a call to attend further to as yet incomplete reformist alternatives 
that may portend less violent and more self-determined ways of achieving some 
measure of social order and collective peace.  I begin to develop this argument by 
drawing, in particular, on the work of the Norwegian social theorist and prison 
abolitionist Thomas Mathiesen. 
The essay proceeds in three parts. Part One introduces several influential 
contemporary criminal law reformist approaches and argues that whatever their 
considerable promise, they are limited as alternatives to social order maintenance 
through conventional criminal law enforcement because of their fundamental 
attachment to the status quo in U.S. criminal law administration, with all of its 
associated violence.  Part Two begins to examine the contours and theoretical 
                                                
14 See DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP AND THE 
END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA (2011) (proposing offering second chances 
coupled with credible threats of harsh consequences to drug and gun offenders); Mark A.R. 
Kleiman & Kelsey Hollander, Reducing Crime by Shrinking the Prison Headcount, 9 OHIO STATE J. 
CRIM. L. 89, 92 (2011) (proposing issuing credible threats to subset of offenders to reduce 
violations and incarcerations); FRANKLIN ZIMRING, THE CITY THAT BECAME SAFE: NEW 
YORK’S LESSONS FOR URBAN CRIME AND ITS CONTROL (2011) (examining likely beneficial 
impacts in New York City associated with some combination of “hot spot” policing, stop and 
frisk, and increased numbers of police and accountability mechanisms within police 
departments). 
15 See KENNEDY, supra note 14; Kleiman & Hollander, supra note 14; ZIMRING supra note 
14. 
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promise of “unfinished alternatives.”  Part Three introduces five specific examples of 
unfinished alternatives in the criminal law context.  The “unfinished” quality of each 
of these five alternatives—their partial, aspirational, in-process character—is crucial 
to their potential to usher in new ways of thinking and speaking about criminal law, 
and perhaps ultimately a reformed social order that involves less violence than the 
status quo in criminally-oriented social order maintenance. 
I. Landscapes of Contemporary U.S. Criminal Law Reform and Scholarship  
This Part explores several influential contemporary criminal law reform accounts, 
each of which takes both practically applied and scholarly forms.  I argue in this Part 
that despite holding substantial advantages over the status quo in U.S. criminal law 
administration, each of these reformist projects is significantly limited in that each 
relies fundamentally on maintaining a primary and central role for existing policing, 
prosecution, or incarceration-focused mechanisms of social order maintenance.  In 
this respect, each falls short in enabling new institutional and conceptual means of 
managing the problems currently predominately addressed through criminal law 
enforcement.  This ought to be of at least some concern to those interested in 
confronting criminal law’s violence given the perhaps inevitable indignities and harms 
associated with “stop and frisk” practices, hot spot policing, arrest, jail confinement, 
and other forms of criminal supervision.16 
A. “Flash Incarceration” and Project HOPE 
With far-reaching impact, Mark A. R. Kleiman, professor of Public Policy at the 
UCLA School of Public Affairs, has argued powerfully for a reform program of flash 
incarceration-backed intensive probation.  In When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less 
Crime and Less Punishment, Kleiman proposes eliminating randomized severity in 
criminal sentencing and concentrating on the swiftness and certainty of individually-
tailored intensive probation supervision backed by the threat of immediate short-term 
jail-based punishment.17  According to Kleiman and his collaborators, a program of 
large-scale flash incarceration-backed intensive probation would reduce dramatically 
both crime and incarceration.  Kleiman maintains that this would decrease overall 
rates of offending through more efficacious and targeted deterrence and would permit 
                                                
16 See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2164-2166 (2002) 
(“Stops, frisks, arrests, detentions, questioning—these things are generally unpleasant and can 
be seriously harmful … Anytime the government does something that has concentrated costs 
but diffused benefits, there is a danger that it will do too much … [P]olitical checks will not do 
the job, given politicians’ natural tendency to worry too little about those who bear the 
nonmonetary cost of police work …”); see also Butler, supra note 8 (noting the parallels between 
“stop and frisk,” torture, and sexual harassment). 
17 See MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME 
AND LESS PUNISHMENT (2009). 
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more persons to be released on intensively supervised probation, markedly shrinking 
the size of incarcerated populations in prison (as opposed to jail).18  
Kleiman’s proposals were first enthusiastically (and in important regards 
successfully) embraced by Judge Steven Alm in his Project HOPE probation program 
in Honolulu, Hawaii.19  Project HOPE deploys Kleiman’s 5 C formula for effective 
deterrence, which stresses Concentration of the probation department’s attention on a 
subset of the caseload that permits the supervising program to Communicate a Credible 
warning of high-Certainty, high-Celerity sanction to each probationer. 20  Through 
Project HOPE, Judge Alm supervises a group of high-risk drug-involved offenders; he 
requires unusually intensive supervision and reporting; he warns that violation 
(primarily failed or “dirty” drug testing) will result in an immediate hearing and 
revocation, but he reduces the typical sanction to short two-day stays in jail as 
opposed to many weeks, months, or years in prison. 21  Project HOPE probationers 
are required to call a number every morning to learn if they will be randomly drug 
tested.  They are warned by Judge Alm before being assigned to Project HOPE that 
violation of the terms of their probation, including failure to phone in, will lead to 
immediate jail sanctions in contrast to the conventional supervisory regime in which 
individuals are often permitted numerous lapses with less stringent supervision prior 
to having their probation revoked and being sentenced to prison.  Project HOPE 
probationers are often randomly drug tested after phoning in, approximately six times 
per month.  If they test positive they are immediately sent to jail for a relatively short 
stay.22  
In a randomized controlled trial HOPE probationers had lowered violation rates 
despite being more strictly supervised.  Arrests for new felonies were also far less 
frequent in the experimental group with days in prison reduced by over half. 23  Jail 
time, however, was roughly equivalent for the two groups.  Similar programs are now 
being implemented in Alaska, California and Delaware, among other states, and the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance will fund four replication programs, which contractors for 
the National Institute of Justice will evaluate.24 
Notwithstanding the notable cost-savings associated with reduced imprisonment 
and reduced recidivism, the Project HOPE approach is still a criminal law reform 
strategy that fundamentally relies on incarceration (and may result in equivalent use 
of jail-based sentencing) even if it does in important respects (and this is hugely 
significant) appear to reduce prison sentence lengths.  Simply put, jail time is 
equivalent for both groups in the HOPE study even if prison time is reduced.  
                                                
18 See id. 
19 See Kleiman & Hollander, supra note 14, at 102. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 103. 
24 Id. at 103. 
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Further, even short stays in jail may significantly disrupt a person’s employment, 
family life, and have other significant deleterious consequences. 
It may also be the case that the prison-reducing, cost-reducing results in the 
Project HOPE study have something to do with the charismatic personality and 
persuasive capacity of Judge Alm, who is extraordinarily thoughtful and committed to 
his program.25  The results produced by Judge Alm may therefore not be replicable. 
Moreover, it is too early to tell whether the warning regime and more effective 
probation officer engagement in the Hawaii program or the monitoring structure and 
flash incarceration are the more critical causal variables.  
Finally, and most significantly, though, are the baselines according to which 
“success” is determined and the limited normative vision for change in criminal law of 
Project HOPE and Kleiman’s 5Cs deterrence model, as compared to an alternative 
that would more fundamentally confront criminal law’s violence.  Project HOPE’s 
success is demonstrated by comparison to an utterly broken baseline—the status quo 
in criminal law administration and underfunded and poorly orchestrated probation 
and parole systems—characterized by extraordinarily high recidivism and prison 
readmission, by gross racial and class disproportion, wasted lives and resources, and 
minimal deterrent or other meaningful enforcement for the populations most often 
targeted. 26   So although Kleiman’s proposed intensive monitoring and flash 
incarceration regime may be a very significant improvement on that status quo, that 
by itself does not make it a desirable (let alone optimal) reformist alternative to 
conventional criminal law-oriented social order maintenance.  It is not an alternative 
means of social order maintenance but simply a limited, if still significant, 
modification of the most dysfunctional aspects of the status quo regime.  And it is a 
modification that relies on the same instrumentalities—arrest, policing, jailing, and 
probation or parole—that entail much of criminal law’s violence, even if to a lesser 
degree and extent than the currently predominant approaches to supervised release. 
B. “Don’t Shoot” and Operation Ceasefire  
David Kennedy, professor of Criminal Justice at John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice, writes about, studies, and organizes “Operation Ceasefire” programming.  
Kennedy helped spearhead this deterrence-focused criminal law reform initiative 
beginning in Boston in the late 1990s.27  Like Kleiman’s work and Judge Alm’s 
Project HOPE probation program, Kennedy’s “Ceasefire” interventions are also 
“focused deterrence” efforts, which offer social support to offenders if they abstain 
from violent behavior but threaten harsh enforcement in the instance of any 
                                                
25  See Hon. Steven S. Alm, Triage: A New Medical Model for Sentencing and Probation, 
PERSPECTIVES: AM. PROBATION & PAROLE ASS’N. 42 (Winter 2012). 
26 See PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM 12 (2011) (finding that 
between 8 to 50% of new prison admissions arise from violation of terms of probation or 
parole, often for technical infractions not constituting new crimes). 
27 See KENNEDY, supra note 14.  
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violation.28  The “Ceasefire” interventions generally unfold as follows: Police identify 
well-known offenders in a given community, establish cases against those individuals, 
but in lieu of prosecuting invite those persons to a meeting where they are warned 
that unless the shooting or drug dealing stops, they face immediate arrest, conviction, 
and a lengthy prison term.  The identified individuals are also provided with 
information about social service programming.29  According to Kennedy, homicides 
have fallen in multiple cities as a result of “Ceasefire” programming.  However, none 
of these results are necessarily attributable to Kennedy’s interventions as it is hard to 
disaggregate the effects of “Ceasefire” programming from other factors that may have 
contributed to declining crime in those jurisdictions.30 
Kennedy’s project, like Kleiman’s, ultimately relies on the threat of lengthy prison 
sentences, police presence, and looming prosecutions as a means of achieving focused 
deterrence.  Kennedy’s account too, then, fails to present a fundamental alternative to 
social order maintenance organized around policing, prosecution, and prison-based 
sentencing.  Though it provides an important improvement over the status quo where 
it reduces violence and incarceration, “Ceasefire” programming similarly modifies 
minimally the operation of existing crime-governance arrangements without 
departing from them.31  Again, the central institutions that are enlisted as drivers of 
reform are threatened prosecution and incarceration, with all of the violence those 
institutions entail.  And though the deterrence message may be delivered in part by 
community members and not just by police and prosecutors, the approach to order 
maintenance is not substantially more self-determined than conventional criminal law 
administration.  This is not to say, of course, that “Ceasefire” programming may not 
promise substantial benefits, but that it offers a limited temporal and institutional 
account of alternative means of responding to the complex social concerns currently 
regulated all too often through criminal law enforcement.  
C. “Hot Spot” Policing, Stop and Frisk, and the City That Became Safe 
 In The City That Became Safe: New York’s Lessons For Urban Crime and Its Control, 
Franklin Zimring, a law professor and criminologist at UC Berkeley, sets out to 
understand how New York City managed to reduce by 80 percent rates of homicide, 
robbery, and burglary at the same time as the incarceration rate in New York State 
decreased by 28 percent between 1990 and 2008.32  The decrease in both crime and 
incarceration in New York is particularly striking given that over the same period the 
national incarceration rate increased by 65 percent and crime fell by only 40 
percent. 33   Zimring considers a series of possible explanations and concludes, 
                                                
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See SIMON, supra note 9 (exploring crime-governance and its impact on U.S. carceral 
practices). 
32 See ZIMRING, supra note 14. 
33 See id. 
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effectively by process of elimination, that this additional crime decline is attributable 
to some combination of “hot spot” policing (where police focus on crime “hot spots”), 
stop and frisk, increased numbers of police, and increased policing accountability 
mechanisms such as Compstat.34  Although it is explanatory rather than prescriptive, 
Zimring’s account, like Kleiman’s and Kennedy’s, has received a great deal of 
attention from criminal justice policy-makers and has been embraced by some as a 
way to envision a criminal law reform program organized around “smart policing” 
that would simultaneously reduce crime and incarceration.35  
Even as there are clear benefits associated with the reductions in violent crime and 
rates of incarceration suggested by Zimring’s analysis, the methods of hot spot 
policing, diversion of public resources for increased policing capacity, and stop and 
frisk themselves produce social harms.36  For instance, “smart policing,” though 
undoubtedly an improvement in terms of cost-savings and improved welfare over 
larger-scale incarceration, continues to locate social order maintenance in 
conventional criminal law enforcement institutions and in policing tactics that entail 
not insubstantial indiginities and painful intrusions.37  These approaches similarly fail 
to transform the ethos of the relevant institutions so that they might perpetuate less 
violence.  Accordingly, Zimring’s account and the New York City policing reforms 
fail to depart from the central institutions, approaches, and power relationships that 
contribute to perpetuating criminal law’s core harms.  Whatever other promise those 
reforms hold, they are thus limited as violence-reducing alternative approaches to 
social order maintenance through criminal law administration. 
 
D. Cross-Cutting Imaginative and Institutional Limitations: Revisiting the 
“Trolley Problem” 
 
The famous “trolley problem” may help to capture more broadly and 
metaphorically some of the crucial limitations that cut across these and various other 
contemporary criminal law reform accounts.38  The trolley problem is a moral 
paradox or hypothetical first posed by the philosopher Philippa Foot in her 1967 
paper, “Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect.”39  The most common iteration 
of the problem relates to a trolley on a track. The trolley is careening toward a group 
                                                
34 See id. 
35 See, e.g., Gopnik, supra note 4; Heather MacDonald, It’s the Cops, Stupid!, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/franklin-zimring-new-york-urban-
crime-control-city-safe#. 
36 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 8; Gelman, supra note 8. 
37 See Butler, supra note 8; Gelman, supra note 8. 
38 See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L.J. 1395, 1395-1415 (1985). 
39 Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect in VIRTUES AND 
VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978) (originally 
appeared in the Oxford Review, No. 5, 1967). 
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of persons who face certain death if they are hit. One is asked to imagine oneself as 
the conductor and to choose whether to divert the trolley from the course where it 
will kill many more people (by flipping a switch) to a course where it will kill only one.  
The choice is effectively between sitting passively by as a larger group of persons is 
killed or flipping the switch to prevent those persons’ deaths but actively contributing 
to the death of one innocent person. 
The original formulation of the problem by Foot is closer to the subject of criminal 
law’s violence: 
Suppose that a judge or magistrate is faced with rioters demanding that a culprit be 
found for a certain crime and threatening otherwise to take their own bloody revenge 
on a particular section of the community.  The real culprit being unknown, the judge 
sees himself as able to prevent the bloodshed only by framing some innocent person 
and having him executed.40  
This is a difficult and painful choice that confronts the judge (or the trolley conductor) 
and the problem is used, among other purposes, to test our moral intuitions about 
consequentialism.   
The argument in the foregoing and following sections, however, is that we ought 
to resist the hypothetical in some measure.  The trolley problem may be resisted 
because it presents a choice created out of a false sense of necessity. And in our criminal 
law and policy we are often acting out of a similar sense of false necessity.  
The judge in Foot’s formulation of the problem may turn to other institutions, 
may act to bring about changes in the governing regime, in legal institutional design, 
in political design, in ways that refuse the rioters their claim to harm others and refuse 
to frame an innocent person.  Likewise, in confronting criminal law’s violence, an 
important response may be to recognize that we have too readily accepted at the 
outset a bad set of political and institutional design choices.  These choices could be 
rejected, with the insistence instead that it ought to be possible to manage drastically 
fewer problems relating to mental illness and addiction, among other complex social 
concerns, through criminal law administration.  In other words, other social 
institutional and political design choices might obviate the trolley problem that faces 
us in some significant measure.   
II. The Alternative as Unfinished 
 This Part will begin to explore how it might be both important and necessary 
to undertake criminal law reform initiatives that are less comprehensive, less complete 
in their proposed modifications to the status quo in criminal law administration and 
less reliant on the institutions of policing, prosecution and prison or jail-based 
punishment.  The unfinished alternatives explored in this and the following Part seek 
to confront criminal law’s violence by substituting alternative mechanisms of social order 
maintenance and by enlisting in the project of reform other social entities and persons 
subject to enforcement regimes themselves. Accordingly, these alternatives may 
                                                
40 Id. at 23.  
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enable other social institutional and political design choices, other less violent means 
of achieving some semblance of social order or collective peace. 
What more precisely is an “unfinished alternative” or the “alternative as 
unfinished”? An unfinished alternative is a “sketch,” a beginning, an attempt to 
change the existing state of affairs through an intervention that is partial, incomplete 
and in process.  In his book The Politics of Abolition, Norwegian social theorist and 
prison abolitionist Thomas Mathiesen explains some of the promise of unfinished 
alternatives as follows:  
“[A]ny attempt to change the existing order into something completely finished, a 
fully formed entity, is destined to fail . . . .”41  An “alternative is ‘alternative’ in so far 
as it is not based on the premises of the old system, but on its own premises.”42   
Any viable alternative approach must contradict at least certain premises of the old 
system and at the same time compete with the system to be replaced.43  In other words, 
for an alternative to be truly distinct from the existing state of affairs, it must in some 
significant manner be dissimilar from things as they are (it must contradict); though, 
to be plausible as an alternative, any proposal for change must not be so contradictory 
as to be unrecognizable and unfathomable in light of the world as it is (it must 
compete).44 
When a truly contradictory alternative is fully formed, that is “finished,” in the 
context of the existing system it will likely be rejected out of hand because it is so 
foreign to the existing system as to be unrecognizable as a viable state of affairs.  It is 
thus contradictory but non-competing: such fully formed contradictions will “be 
disregarded as permanently ‘outside’ and thereby be set aside.”45   
Mathiesen clarifies that “the concept of competition takes, as its point of 
departure, the subjective standpoint of the satisfied system-member being confronted 
with an opposition.  The political task is that of exposing to such a member the 
insufficiency of being satisfied with the system as it is.  When this is exposed, the 
opposition competes.”46   
Therefore, any meaningful workable alternative must be articulable in terms that 
are recognizable and conceivable to someone embedded in the existing state of affairs.  
However, such an alternative must retain in significant measure its inconsistent 
features, so as to remain distinct from the status quo.  Another problem confronted by 
                                                
41 See MATHIESEN, supra note 2, at 13. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at 14. 
44 See id. 
(“An arrangement which does not compete with the old system, an arrangement which 
is not relevant for the members of the old system . . . is no alternative. The main 
problem, then, is that of obtaining the combination of the contradicting and the 
competing; the main problem is that of avoiding that your contradiction becomes non-
competing and that your competition becomes agreement. The main aim is that of 
attaining the competing contradiction.”) 
45 Id. at 14–15. 
46 Id. at 14. 
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“finished” (i.e. complete, fully formed) alternatives is that in order to remain 
conceivable they cease to be truly alternative, that is, distinct from and oppositional to 
the status quo. 
The unfinished alternative is what permits the competing contradiction, because 
an alternative that seeks to express a different and distinct arrangement but in a 
partial manner that does not entirely displace or re-make the status quo (i.e. is 
unfinished) can remain both unlike existing arrangements and legible within them.  Put 
otherwise, the unfinished alternative presents the possibility of sustained competition 
and contradiction within the existing system because although it is truly alternative in 
the sense of promising something different, it is decidedly not fully formed, and so can 
be envisioned as coming into being incrementally within the bounds of the existing 
system, even as, at some later point, the alternative itself may usher in a new state of 
affairs that will displace the existing state of affairs.   
This partial or suggested quality is necessary too because it is not possible to 
generate an alternative that is truly and utterly distinct from the status quo as our 
imaginations are constrained by our existing social arrangements. The unfinished 
alternative emerges when we refuse “to remain silent concerning that which we 
cannot talk about.”47   
Of course, it is an immense challenge to maintain a sketch as a sketch in political 
life. As Mathiesen recognizes: “An enormous political pressure exists in the direction 
of completing the sketch into a finished drawing, and thereby ending the growth of 
the product.”48  But in our grasping attempts to fashion a competing, contradictory, 
and in that sense new state of affairs, we “express the unfinished.”49  
The following table captures some of the limits and possibilities associated with 
unfinished alternatives reform proposals that aim both to compete with and 
contradict the status quo.50 
 
The proposal is Foreign Integrated 
Suggested Competing 
contradiction 
(alternative) 
Competing agreement 
Fully Formed Non-competing 
contradiction 
Non-competing 
agreement 
 
Mathiesen offers several examples of “unfinished” alternatives.  These include love 
and the “treatment experiment” in Scandinavian criminal justice policy that unfolded 
in concert with the advocacy work of a prison reform organization KRUM (the 
Norwegian Association for Penal Reform).  
Love is unfinished for “love is boundless.”51  Love’s precise beginnings and endings 
are uncertain: “We do not know where it will lead us, we do not know where it will 
                                                
47 Id. at 16 (interpreting Wittgenstein).  
48 Id. at 13. 
49 Id. at 16. 
50 Lightly adapted from id. at 17. 
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stop. . . .  It ceases, is finished, when it is tried out and when its boundaries are 
clarified and determined—finally drawn.  It represents an alternative to ‘the existing 
state of things:’ to existence in resigned loneliness or routinized marriage.”52  
In a somewhat more concrete manner, Mathiesen notes the Scandinavian 
prisoners’ welfare movement organization KRUM and the associated “treatment 
experiment” existed in “an unfinished state [during their development] . . . .”53  The 
modern Scandinavian prison reform movement, Mathiesen explains, began with an 
unprecedented gathering in the late 1960s of a “Parliament of Thieves” from 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden who convened in large numbers and told the public 
and the press what life in prison was like.54  Continuing to the present, convicted 
offenders may obtain furloughs from prison to participate in the organizations’ 
meetings and conferences.  
Numerous reforms in treatment of prisoners and in criminal justice policy have 
occurred over the period of time in which KRUM and associated organizations have 
been active.  The very unfolding of this experiment—the radical inclusion and 
collaboration of prisoners, state administrators, and criminal justice policy experts to 
uncertain ends—presented an alternative to the established state of things, for 
example to traditional hierarchically-structured hospitals and prisons.55  Over time, 
Norway’s prison movement, through KRUM and related organizations, brought 
about a radical shift in criminal law and prison administration in the region.  Minor 
offending conduct was effectively decriminalized and more serious conduct is 
punishable by a maximum of twenty-one years incarceration.56  On Norway’s Bastoy 
Prison Island, which houses serious violent offenders, including persons who have 
committed murder, the “governor” of the prison is a clinical psychologist, training to 
become a prison guard is a three year course, and the goal of the imprisonment 
experience is for serious offenders to take responsibility for their acts removed from a 
context where they would pose a threat to others, and to obtain release with the 
ability to function without violence.57  Prisoners grow their own food, they live in 
humane conditions with access to education, work and skills training, and the 
recidivism rate is 16%, the lowest in Europe and far below that of any U.S. 
jurisdiction. 58  Conditions in Bastoy, depicted in the image below where an inmate 
sunbathes on the deck of his bungalow, seek to mimic and improve upon in significant 
respects conditions to which prisoners might otherwise return upon their release. 59 
                                                                                                                           
51 Id. at 16–17. 
52 Id.  
53  See Thomas Mathiesen, About Krom – Past – Present – Future (January 2000), 
http://www.krom.no/hva_er_krom_more.php?id=89_0_26_0_C. 
54 See id.  
55 See MATHIESEN, supra note 2, at 17. 
56 See Erwin James, The Norwegian Prison Where Inmates Are Treated Like People, GUARDIAN, 
Feb. 24, 2013, G2 at 9. 
57 See id. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
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           60 
 
Mathiesen points out, though, that the treatment experiment in the Scandinavian 
context ceased to be unfinished, when “wondering” withered and “boundaries were 
drawn,” when the treatment project was incorporated into the establishment, and 
became integrated with criminalization and punishment or medicalization. 61  
Nonetheless, the marked confrontation and contradicting perspectives presented by 
the reformist coalitions forged through KRUM contributed to substantial shifts in 
what was conceivable as a response to social disorder.   
Crucially, the organization’s efforts reached their greatest potential not in their 
ultimate, fixed realization but as they came to impact and reshape perspectives on 
how social order (and criminal law) might be administered.  KRUM’s potential 
inhered in an often grasping, incremental attempt to fashion a social imaginary 
around a shared set of problems, with unclear temporal horizons, and flexible, in-
process organizational or institutional parameters.62 
“What is strange,” Mathiesen notes, “is that we rarely act in line with this. We 
rarely view the ‘pioneering stage’ as life itself; rather we tend to view it as ‘only a 
beginning.’”63  What Mathiesen’s work offers to contemporary criminal law reformist 
scholarship and advocacy is a framework within which to engage seriously and learn 
from unfinished, in-process, and, in that regard, potentially truly alternative 
initiatives.  In contrast to many contemporary criminal law reformist projects, this 
framework and associated initiatives may promise new and substantially less violent 
conceptual and institutional approaches to social order maintenance. 
 
                                                
60 Photograph: Marco Di Lauro.  
61 MATHIESEN, supra note 2, at 17. 
62 See id.  
63 Id. 
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III. Unfinished Criminal Law Reformist Alternatives 
This Part begins to consider five criminal law reform innovations which represent 
unfinished efforts to re-shape criminal law enforcement and social order maintenance 
practices in a fundamental, thoroughgoing, structural and yet still partial direction.  
Each of these reformist projects enlists institutions and persons apart from 
conventional criminal law administrative entities—decriminalization boards, 
agricultural and infrastructural developers, former narco-cultivators, violence 
interrupters or community member mediators, and a range of social service providers 
aligned with certain specialized diversionary courts.  Some of these efforts also enlist 
persons previously subject to criminal law enforcement in the formulation and 
execution of relevant policies.  This expansion in the range of institutions and 
perspectives brought to bear on the problems of achieving social order promises to 
improve the self-determining character of resulting policies, and perhaps in so doing 
to improve perceived legitimacy and compliance, as well as to reduce violence.  
A. Decriminalization 
Decriminalization, particularly decriminalization of narcotics-related conduct, 
may be an important component of confronting criminal law’s violence.  In the 
United States, large numbers of persons are arrested for marijuana-related violations, 
including simple possession, when there is little if any evidence that marijuana causes 
substantial harm.64  By some accounts, there were 50,000 arrests in New York City in 
2011 for minor possession of marijuana.65   
Responding to public sentiment that marijuana criminalization in particular is 
misguided, numerous U.S. jurisdictions have partially decriminalized marijuana 
possession, including Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington, among other states. 66   This gradual 
decriminalization reform will reduce the human and economic costs of large-scale 
arrest and incarceration of persons for marijuana-related offenses. 
Some jurisdictions have gone substantially farther, decriminalizing a greater range 
of controlled substances and shifting to a public health model for addressing the 
problem of addiction.  In 2001, Portugal, for example, became the first European 
country to officially abolish all criminal penalties for personal possession of narcotics, 
including marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine.67  Individuals found to 
possess small amounts of these narcotics are sent to a panel composed of a 
psychologist, social worker, and legal counselor for appropriate treatment.  The 
                                                
64 See, e.g., The Marijuana Arrest Problem, Continued, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 4, 2012. 
65 See id.  
66 See NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR THE REFORM OF MARIJUANA LAWS (NORML), 
STATES THAT HAVE DECRIMINALIZED, http://norml.org/aboutmarijuana/item/states-
that-have-decriminalized (last visited Apr. 24, 2013). 
67 See GLENN GREENWALD, DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL: LESSONS FOR 
CREATING FAIR AND SUCCESSFUL DRUG POLICIES (2009). 
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treatment may be refused without criminal punishment and there is no looming 
threat of jail.68  A 2009 study by the Cato Institute found that in the five years after 
personal possession was decriminalized, illegal drug use among teens in Portugal 
decreased, rates of new HIV infections through sharing of dirty needles declined, and 
the number of people seeking treatment for drug addiction more than doubled.69  
Following decriminalization, Portugal had lower rates of drug use than other 
European countries and substantially lower drug use rates than the United States. 70 
Decriminalization undoubtedly raises a host of questions unaddressed in this 
necessarily preliminary exploration. How far decriminalization could extend and to 
what categories of drug-related and other conduct is uncertain. It is even unclear 
whether or how decriminalization would take hold in particular locales subject to 
pervasive and damaging drug law enforcement.  The prospects for decriminalization 
and its desirability in any given jurisdiction likely depend significantly on local 
political and other circumstances pertaining to drug markets, patterns of addiction, 
and broader patterns of interpersonal conflict and harm.  But decriminalization is a 
criminal law reform alternative that may serve to substantially reduce criminal law’s 
violence and to shift resources and attention to other institutions as sites for managing 
addiction and other forms of social disorder.  It is an unfinished alternative that ought 
to occupy a more prominent place than it currently does in criminal law reformist 
discourse, both in the narcotics context and in other currently criminalized contexts. 
B. Alternative Development 
Alternative Development Programming, championed by the United Nations in the 
criminal law and development context, involves subsidies to narco-cultivators to 
introduce non-narcotic crops—such as oil palm, which can be used as bio fuel or to 
make other consumer products—and technical assistance with accessing international 
markets until the licit alternative becomes self-sustaining. 71   Participation in 
alternative development programming is often voluntary, not subject to threat of 
criminal or other legal sanction. Studies of the effects of alternative development 
programming show that on a local scale many narco-cultivators elect to switch 
entirely to the licit alternative if it allows them to better provide for their families and 
enables an improved quality of life.72  Areas that transition from narco-cultivation to 
other crops may also experience a significant reduction in the violence associated with 
narco-trafficking.73  
One alternative development client, a coffee-growing cooperative in the Cuzco 
Province of Peru, the Central Cooperativas de la Convención y Lares, increased its 
                                                
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. 
71 See, e.g., U.N. Office on Drugs & Crime, Alternative Development: A Global Thematic 
Evaluation: Final Synthesis Report, at v–vi, 12–13 (Mar. 1, 2005).  
72 See id.  
73 See id.  
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exports from 3,000 tons in 1997 to 8,000 tons in 2003.74  Since 1997, the cooperative 
has exported directly rather than through middlemen, and in 2001 ceased relying on 
foreign development assistance.75  
In Colombia’s southern Cauca Province, in 1993, where both coca bush and 
poppy are grown, the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime helped to support the 
formation of the Empresa Cooperativa del Sur del Cauca to organize 19 small-farmer 
producer groups.76  Along the same lines as the Peruvian coffee growing cooperative, 
the Colombian organization makes it possible for 1,500 families, many Amerindian, 
to sell fair trade organic coffee (at twice the farm-gate price of regular coffee) to 
Europe.77  Though alternative development programming is not without its problems, 
limitations, and critics, this particular project has increased the wealth of these 
farmers through a transition to crops that are more lucrative and secure than their 
previous livelihoods.78 
In the coca producing region of the Huallaga Valley in Peru, a producers’ 
association and a processing plant, with initial financial assistance from the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime shifted to producing palm oil.79  Palm oil is 
derived from the fruit of small tropical palm trees and can be used to produce edible 
vegetable oil, soap, and as an ingredient in bio-fuels. 80   The association and 
processing plant have assumed a hybrid institutional form, as both cooperative and 
firm, in which both the association and individual farmers hold shares.  
In these programs too the farmers are not forced to participate. Rather, the 
farmers join the program on a voluntary basis and may transition gradually to the licit 
crops.81   
Some Latin American states are also now buying coca crops from narco-
cultivators to make toothpaste, soap and other consumer products. This is occurring 
at the same time as certain of the United States-promoted criminally-focused 
counternarcotics policies are being reconsidered.82 
Tying social order maintenance to development programming or government 
buy-outs of narco-crops as an alternative to conventional criminal law intervention is 
a partial, unfinished alternative in that it is unclear how it would be scaled up and out, 
                                                
74 Id. at 5. 
75 Id. 
76 Id at 6.  
77 Id.  
78 See id.  
79 See id at 5.  
80 See id.  
81 See id at vii.  
82 See Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 161 
(2010); Jean Friedman-Rudovsky, Bolivian Buzz: Coca Farmers Switch to Coffee Beans, TIME, Feb. 
29, 2012, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2107750,00.html; Evo Morales 
Launches ‘Coca Colla,’ TELEGRAPH, Jan. 10, 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/bolivia/6962746/Evo-Morales-
launches-Coca-Colla.html. 
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or how it would interact with campaigns for decriminalization of certain conduct.  It 
is possible to imagine how social order maintenance could be tied to development 
programming without changes to substantive criminal law, but simply in the face of 
different discretionary enforcement decision-making, or to imagine alternative 
development programming as a complement to decriminalization programs. 
Unlike some of the influential criminal law reformist approaches examined in Part 
I, alternative development is not introduced as a model that may be uniformly 
adopted in other locations or without adjustment outside the narco-cultivation 
context.  And of course, it is important to note that alternative development 
programming carries its own costs and is not a panacea for the harms of the narcotics 
trade or narcotics addiction.  
For present purposes, it is most significant that alternative livelihoods programs 
both enlist separate institutions in order maintenance (development organizations, 
agricultural consultants, exporters, and related actors), in a partial and incremental 
manner, and enable the formation of associations of former narco-cultivators to self-
determine how best to structure their businesses and maintain security in their 
respective regions.  Additionally, due to this unfinished, context-dependent, 
incremental approach, alternative development programs may be defined gradually, 
with experiential and rigorous empirical input over time, in ways that might enable 
both conceptually and institutionally alternative, and less violent, forms of response to 
social disorder and unauthorized economic activity. 
In these respects, alternative development programming may serve as a model for 
intervention in domestic narcotics markets in the United States or in other currently 
criminalized markets.  For example, alternative livelihoods could be subsidized for 
persons involved in selling narcotics in U.S. neighborhoods until licit or preferred 
alternatives become self-sustaining.  More broadly, this model offers a manner of 
imagining institutional and structural social order maintenance alternatives to 
predominant reliance on criminal law administrative apparatuses to achieve desired 
objectives.  Small business development assistance operating similarly to the assistance 
that facilitates alternative livelihoods for narco-cultivators in rural contexts may serve 
as a means of envisioning less violent incremental intervention in various domains of 
criminalized conduct, particularly where participation in the licit alternative is 
voluntary rather than induced through the threat of incarceration.   
C. Infrastructural Reform 
A movement in criminal justice policy toward “problem-oriented” social order 
maintenance commends infrastructural and design improvements as a means of crime 
reduction.  Improvements along these lines include investments such as improved 
street lighting, store design, product design, and facility design.83   These design 
                                                
83 See, e.g., Ronald V. Clarke & Patricia M. Harris, Auto Theft and Its Prevention, 16 CRIME & 
JUST. 1, 37 (1992) (reviewing how simple design interventions may substantially reduce auto 
theft); Cecelia Klingele et al., Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 966 
(exploring how sprinkler systems may dispel outdoor, open-air drug markets); McLeod, supra 
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reforms may go a considerable distance toward reducing risks of interpersonal 
violence, including robbery and rape, if places where such offenses occur are better 
lighted and more secure.  The degree to which design—design of physical spaces, 
cars, windows and the like—could inhibit theft and other interpersonal harm is 
uncertain, but it is a mode of thinking about social order maintenance and crime 
prevention that moves toward a focus on space and opportunities to offend rather 
than on conventional policing, prosecution, and punishment.84  Further, it is an 
incremental, partial, in-process approach increasingly embraced by development 
agencies and progressive law enforcement organizations. 85   The following table 
reflects how both design modifications and other opportunity and incentive-shaping 
policy choices may be conceptualized as operating to maintain social order outside 
the framework of conventional criminal law enforcement, even as these interventions 
may generate other under-appreciated costs.86  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
note 82 at 160 (discussing how infrastructure development—including public transportation 
networks and street lighting projects—may serve as a means of improving citizens’ security). 
84 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002). 
85  See, e.g., VERA LUCÍA VECENTINI ET AL., INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, PERU: 
METROPOLITAN LIMA URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM (PTUL)—NORTH-SOUTH 
SUBSYSTEM: LOAN PROPOSAL 5, 13, 38 (2004) (proposing that improvements to public safety 
will be associated with improving public transport and street lighting); see also Clarke, supra 
note 83. 
86 Adapted from CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING, TWENTY-FIVE TECHNIQUES 
OF SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION (2012), http://www.popcenter.org/25techniques. 
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Increase Effort Increase Risk Reduce Rewards Reduce 
Provocation 
Encourage Pro-
Social Behavior 
Target harden 
-steering 
column locks 
-anti-robbery 
screens 
Extend 
guardianship 
-leave signs of 
occupancy 
-neighborhood 
watch 
Conceal targets 
-unmarked 
bullion trucks 
-off-street 
parking 
Reduce 
frustrations and 
stress 
-muted lights 
-expand seating 
Set rules 
-harassment 
codes 
-rental 
agreements 
-hotel 
registration 
Control access  
-electronic card 
access 
-entry phones 
Assist natural 
surveillance 
-improved 
street lighting 
-defensible 
space design 
Remove targets 
-increase 
women’s 
shelters/refuges 
-removable car 
stereo 
Avoid disputes 
-fixed cab fares 
Post instructions 
-“private 
property” 
-“no parking” 
-“extinguish 
camp fires” 
Screen exits 
-electronic 
merchandise 
tags 
Reduce 
anonymity 
-taxi driver 
IDs 
-school 
uniforms 
Identify 
property 
-property 
marking 
Reduce 
emotional 
arousal 
-prohibit/ 
discourage 
racial invective 
Alert conscience 
-roadside speed 
display boards 
-signatures for 
customs declar. 
Deflect 
Offenders 
-street closures 
Utilize place 
managers 
-CCTV 
-at least two 
clerks in stores 
Disrupt markets 
-monitor pawn 
shops 
Neutralize peer 
pressure 
-public health 
messaging 
Assist 
compliance 
-make available 
garbage cans 
-public 
restrooms 
Control 
tools/weapons 
-disable stolen 
cell phones 
-gun control 
Strengthen 
formal 
surveillance 
-burglar 
alarms 
Deny benefits 
-graffiti cleaning 
-speed humps 
-ink 
merchandise 
tags 
Discourage 
imitation 
-rapid repair of 
vandalism 
Control drugs 
and alcohol 
-breathalyzers 
in bars 
-permit server 
intervention 
 
Again, what is significant is the move to achieve some substantial measure of social 
order through institutions and interventions separate from conventional criminal law 
enforcement entities, without the potential for harm associated with hands-on policing 
tactics and jailing, and in ways that allow for potential offenders to be relatively self-
governing.  This problem-oriented approach is gradual, context-specific, and 
incremental—unfinished—and aims to deploy infrastructure and design to achieve 
social order maintenance objectives. 
D. Decarceration Courts 
Certain specialized criminal courts operating as what I have referred to elsewhere 
as “Decarceration Courts”—for example, mental health courts and drug courts—may 
serve as diversionary conduits funneling substantial numbers of cases out of 
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conventional criminal sentencing and toward alternative social service institutions.87  
The work of these courts is often empirically monitored to provide evidence that for a 
whole range of cases incarceration (and perhaps criminal intervention more generally) 
is unnecessary.88  Ultimately, a decarceration model of specialized criminal court case 
processing aims to identify those limited number of crimes for which criminal law 
intervention is most fitting, simultaneously contributing to the de facto 
decriminalization of certain other categories of conduct, and facilitating non-carceral 
responses to a range of other social ills.89   
It must be noted that there is enormous variation among specialized criminal 
courts and some such courts operate on a model decidedly at odds with an agenda of 
reduced criminal law enforcement and decarceration. 90   But other specialized 
criminal courts are engaged in a social change agenda oriented towards 
fundamentally shifting resources and public understanding to enable less violent 
means of managing social concerns too often managed through criminal courts and 
criminal punishment. 91 
This approach to decarceration is necessarily incremental, unfinished: a gradual 
and aspirational process of reduced reliance on conventional criminal law 
intervention.  Ongoing empirical monitoring of the work of diversionary courts may 
shape a broader public policy shift away from criminal prosecution and punishment 
and toward alternative forms of social order maintenance.92 
E. Violence Interrupters 
Violence Interrupters interventions, pioneered by the epidemiologist and 
infectious disease physician Gary Slutkin, are yet another example of unfinished, in 
process criminal law reformist efforts that hold considerable promise in part because 
of the alternative conceptualization of social order maintenance they entail.  Slutkin’s 
Violence Interrupters treat urban violence as an epidemic phenomenon and seek to 
shift the spread of violence as a socially contagious learned system by using 
community-based mediation outside the criminal process.93  Slutkin proposes that 
violence is clustered and spreads in waves like an infectious disease.94  According to 
Slutkin, violence may therefore be better addressed not primarily through punitive or 
other criminal law-related responses, which were also once applied in the context of 
plague and other infectious diseases, but through forms of detection and interruption 
that involve community members who themselves previously engaged in violent 
                                                
87 See Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 
100 GEO. L.J. 1587 (2012). 
88 See id.  
89 See id.  
90 See id.  
91 See id.  
92 See id. at 1631. 
93 See, e.g., THE INTERRUPTERS (Kartemquin Films 2011).  
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behavior.  Community members provide to their neighbors and friends alternative 
scripts, modes of response, and strategies for deescalating tense situations.95  In their 
studies of Violence Interrupters’ work in Chicago and Baltimore, social scientists at 
Northwestern and Johns Hopkins Universities demonstrated that homicide rates have 
decreased in a statistically significant manner, in one neighborhood by over 50 
percent.96 
Responding to violence as an infections epidemic represents an as yet 
underspecified small-scale framework for some measure of social order maintenance, 
one that entails a conceptual and institutional shift in focus towards a public health 
model to containing violence.  In this regard, Violence Interrupters interventions 
present the beginnings of a workable and possibly effective alternative to over-reliance 
on policing, prosecution, and incarceration as responses to interpersonal harm.  This 
approach also enlists persons previously engaged in violence in community self-
governance and in policy formulation outside the conventional criminal process, in 
ways similar to the engagement of former narco-cultivators in the alternative 
development programming context through growers cooperatives.  The Violence 
Interrupters’ epidemiological approach uses these new public health workers to 
analyze clusters and transmission dynamics of violence, emphasizing social 
psychology and neurological research.97  This emergent approach may begin to 
improve and expand our capacity to speak differently about order maintenance 
strategies and community dynamics, creating a new public health discourse about 
violence, crime, and alternative modes of conflict resolution and response, one in 
which persons formerly perpetrating violence actively and constructively participate. 
 
*** 
 
Each of these five initiatives—decriminalization campaigns, alternative 
development programming in the narco-cultivation context in a manner potentially 
applicable to U.S. narco-markets, infrastructural reform, certain decarceration-
focused diversionary court programming, and violence interrupter interventions—is 
legible within an existing state of affairs (that is, each competes) in that each 
alternative intervenes in a practical (and at least partially accepted) manner within a 
particular geographical location on a small yet significant scale.  These are 
alternatives that have been implemented, not ideal, theoretical, purely hypothetical 
alternatives.  Yet, each exercises restraint in refraining from positioning itself as a 
fully-formed alternative approach applicable to any and all other contexts.  Instead, 
with the minor interventions each alternative makes—in terms of restraining and 
channeling law enforcement toward potentially more efficacious and less invasive 
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incentive-shaping and opportunity-shaping, and by improving quality of life through 
re-directing particular unauthorized and undesired markets, and providing 
comprehensive grassroots services to at-risk populations—it becomes possible to begin 
to conceive of other more humane ways of achieving social order than through the 
status quo in our criminal law, policing, prosecutorial programs, probation, jails and 
prisons. 
Conclusion 
This framework of the alternative as unfinished opens the space to speak about 
and imagine different possible organizational arrangements and futures for some of 
the social order maintenance work currently carried out by criminal law 
administration, potentially instigating a process of material change in our institutions, 
as well as in the power relationships that determine who conceptualizes and sets 
relevant laws and policies.  Even as these efforts are spearheaded by the United 
Nations, scholars and local government bodies, these initiatives place otherwise 
disenfranchised individuals—peasant farmers in narco-growing regions or former 
gang members, for example—in co-equal and even leadership positions.  Through 
these and other means, unfinished alternatives may make it feasible for fundamentally 
distinct approaches to become incrementally conceivable, workable, and enforceable, 
and for new voices to gain increased visibility—producing an opening first at the level 
of ideas, then within our institutions, and perhaps ultimately within locations of power 
and in our criminal law and politics.  In these ways, the unfinished reformist 
interventions this essay explores may begin to help us engage an array of complex 
social problems differently, and to confront and depart from some of criminal law’s 
most prevalent violence.  
